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FRONTIERS, ISLANDS, FORESTS, STONES:
Mapping the Geography of a German Identity in the 
Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1900
Pieter M. Judson
In July of 1885, the newly founded League for the Bohe­
mian Woods {Bohmerwaldbun^ advertised a special sale in its 
quarterly newsletter under the headline “Relief Maps of South­
ern Bohemia.” Using the maps of the Imperial and Royal Mili­
tary-Geographic Institute in Vienna, a retired infantry lieuten­
ant had developed a technology for producing finely detailed 
three-dimensional reliefs, which the journal praised enthusi­
astically. The league had negotiated an agreement with the in­
ventor to produce relief maps of the Bohemian Woods at a re­
duced price, depending on how many orders he received. “We 
therefore urge all municipal and county governments, school 
administrators, financial institutions, and associations of every 
kind,” wrote the editors, “to consider ... whether they wish to 
order this extremely important product, which will contribute 
considerably to [the growth of] exact knowledge about our 
land.”i
In the 1880s, “exact knowledge about our land” became a 
new and vital concern for German nationalist organizations 
like the League for the Bohemian Woods. As voluntary asso­
ciations like this one labored to create a sense of national 
identity among German speakers in the multiethnic Habsburg 
Monarchy, they situated that identity in local geography and 
history rather than, as tradition dictated, in allegiance to cer­
tain abstract cultural Ideals. Familiar local relationships were 
to be redefined in terms of nationalist struggle as a way of 
making German identity a more compelling part of local village
This paper is dedicated to Milan Homak and Lars Larson, with whom I 
witnessed the return of several Sudeten Germans to southern Bohemia and 
Moravia and some of its rhetorical consequences. 1 would like to thank Laura 
L. Downs, Daniel A. Segal, and Douglas McKeown for their insightful com­
ments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1 Mittheilungen des deutschen Bdhmerwaldbundes [MDB], no. 2 (1885): 
35. The journal cited the expert opinion of the foremost geographic journal of 
Germany, that this new type of relief map constituted a potentially rich font of 
knowledge for schoolchildren and amateur geographers.
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life. German speakers in the ethnically mixed Moravian town of 
Iglau (Jihlava),^ for example, should no longer think of them­
selves as Iglauers or even as Moravians but above all as Ger­
mans. Their ties to other Germans in Central Europe must 
now outweigh the familiar social and commercial relationships 
they enjoyed with neighbors who spoke Czech.
This transformation of identity would be accomplished by 
locating national identity in the geographic spaces people oc­
cupied, by redefining those spaces according to their particular 
nationalist significance. To continue with the example of Iglau, 
the town became known in the 1880s primarily as an island of 
Germans surrounded by a sea of hostile Czechs. Provinces like 
Moravia, where many such islands were to be found, became 
known as frontiers, where Germans and Slavs met on imagined 
borders. New historical traditions were gradually developed to 
justify this reconceptualization of local identity in national 
terms. Activists claimed the forests of Southern Bohemia (the 
Bohemian Wood), for example, as the ancestral home of an­
cient Teutons, and they pointed out the ways in which archi­
tectural styles and town planning, the very stones themselves, 
confirmed the uniquely German character of the landscape. 
Using several of these related strategies, German nationalists 
hoped one day to supplant parochial village identities with 
more self-consciously nationalist ones.
In this paper I examine the way nationalist activists in the 
Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy transformed their 
rhetoric about the German nation, using spatial metaphors 
that attributed a national identity to the very landscape itself. 
In doing so these activists sought to establish a common and 
politically useful national identity for all German-speaking in­
habitants of Austria’s socially and geographically diverse re­
gions.^ German identity, formerly a desirable elite cultural
^ Wherever possible I have tried to use English terms for place names in 
the ethnically mixed regions of the monarchy. Where such terms do not exist, 1 
have relied on nineteenth-century German place names as they appeared in 
the newspapers, almanacs, and records of voluntary associations that 1 exam­
ined for this paper, and 1 have added the common Czech, Slovene, Polish, or 
Romanian name in parentheses. The choice should in no way imply a prefer­
ence for the German names on my part.
^ In 1867 the unitary Habsburg Empire had been divided into an Aus­
trian and an Hungarian state, each with its own domestic government but
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commodity, became more of a popular local identity in the 
1880s, defined empirically according to language use and 
rooted in physical landscapes. If earlier definitions of German­
ness stressing culture and humanist conviction never died out 
completely, the radically changing political and social condi­
tions in the empire helped foster newer, more empirically 
based forms of self-identification. These later nationalisms pre­
sumed a transhistorical concept of identity, a concept that re­
quired the maintenance of cultural purity. Activists anchored 
the new German Identity in identifiable spaces, conferring a 
specifically German identity on the land Itself and staking a 
claim to any territoiy that was either currently or had been 
historically occupied by German speakers.
All too often, historians analyze the emergence of national­
ist differences in any society by assuming that people neces­
sarily privilege one set of attributes (such as language use) over 
others (such as common regional culture). Yet, contrary to 
popular myths about the nature of politics in the multicultural 
Habsburg Monarchy, differences in language use alone did not 
magically produce nationalist politics. Those who believe that 
class or regional politics inevitably crystallized around existing 
and historic differences of language Ignore at their peril the 
situational specificity of national identities. Differences in lan­
guage use may have been decisive for identity formation in 
some, but certainly not all, cases, as Gary Cohen, Istvan Deak, 
and Katherine Verdery have demonstrated in works on differ-
both sharing a common foreign and commercial policy. The Habsburg mon­
arch was both emperor of Austria and king of Hungary. This paper deals with 
the Austrian half of the dual monarchy, a state whose territoiy included the 
present-day states of Austria, the Czech Republic (Bohemia and Moravia), and 
Slovenia as well as substantial pieces of Italy, Poland, and the Ukraine. For 
convenience 1 refer to this state as “Austria” or simply as the "monarchy.” The 
following is a breakdown of how people identified their “language of daily use” 
[Umgangssprache] according to the census of 1880, the first to record this 
information; German: 36.75 percent; Czech; 23.77 percent; Polish; 14.86 per­
cent; Ukrainian; 12.81 percent; Slovene; 5.23 percent; Serbo-Croatian: 2.6 
percent; Italian; 3.07 percent; Romanian; 0.87 percent. See Adam Wan- 
druszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds.. Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, 
vol. 3/1 (Vienna: Verlag der Osterr, 1980) table 1.
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ent regions and institutions of the monarchy.^ Cohen’s mas­
terful work on Prague’s German-speaking minority clearly 
shows that, over time, people of the urban lower classes often 
changed nationalities if no German nationalist community in­
frastructure (clubs, schools, theaters, etc.) adequately ad­
dressed their social needs in specifically German nationalist 
terms.
Furthermore, if we examine early forms of German na­
tionalist rhetoric, we find that they were not even necessarily 
founded on language use. To mid-nineteenth-century Austri­
ans who thought about it, German identity corresponded far 
more to the cultivation of middle-class, liberal cultural values 
like education, enlightenment, individual self-control, and eco­
nomic independence. The very first German nationalist asso­
ciation founded during the Revolution of 1848 proclaimed a 
belief that Germanness was based “not simply on the soil of 
birth or language of culture but rather on ... nobility of action 
and the worthiness of conviction.’’^ In theory at least, indi­
viduals from any background—Jews, Slavs, peasants, and 
workers—could eventually attain a German identity through 
education and acculturation. German nationalists in the 
Habsburg Monarchy viewed Germanness as a relatively open 
identity, one available to anyone who adopted its principles 
and lived according to its norms, even though few individuals 
outside the middle class might actually obtain the requisite 
income or education. For these German speakers, nationalism 
served as an ideology of public integration in Central and East­
ern Europe, one that would eventually wipe away the back­
ward and particularist attitudes held by uneducated peasants 
and Slavs, joining them all in a great German liberal nation.
These early German nationalists rarely Justified their pre­
eminent social position in terms of their numbers, even though
See Gary B. Cohen, The Politics of Ethnic Survival Germans in Prague, 
1861-1914 (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1981): Istvan Deak, Beyond 
Nationalism: A Political and Social History of the Habsburg Officer Corps 1848- 
1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Deak, “Comments,” Austrian 
History Yearbook, no. 3 (1967); and Katherine Verdery, Transylvanian Villag­
ers: Three Centuries of Political, Economic and Ethnic Change (Berkeley: Uni­
versity of California Press, 1983).
^ Schwarz-Roth-Gold, a newspaper published by the Association of Ger­
mans in Austria, no. 1(11 July 1848).
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theirs was the language spoken by the largest number of peo­
ple (ca. 36 percent) in the monarchy. Rather, they constantly 
referred to their culture’s historic mission as creator of a civi­
lized public sphere in Central Europe. According to these lib­
eral nationalists, neither geographic location nor the sheer 
number of people who spoke a given language was as decisive 
in determining a group’s relative status or power in the monar­
chy as was quality, defined by the group’s cultural and finan­
cial achievement. As one nationalist author pointed out, “With 
the exception of Italian, German is the only one of all the lan­
guages spoken in the Austrian Monarchy that has an absolute 
value: the others have only a relative, local value.’’®
The internal structure of the empire encouraged this kind 
of cultural definition of German nationality. Proficiency in 
German was a crucial prerequisite for any upwardly mobile 
bourgeois seeking higher social status by entering government 
or military service. In reply to Czech nationalist accusations of 
government favoritism toward German candidates for the civil 
service, for example, the Liberal minister of the interior could 
state, “the primary consideration in bureaucratic appointments 
is an official’s ability to do his Job. If a candidate is fluent in 
German, then no matter what his ethnic background, he would 
be considered qualified in this respect.”’’ As the language of 
much interregional commerce, German was also closely asso­
ciated with financial and social achievement. Many German 
liberals presumed that as upwardly mobile Czech or Slovene 
Burger became financially successful and better educated, they 
would naturally Identify themselves as Germans, as indeed 
many did in the 1850s and 1860s.® Nor did early Austro- 
German nationalists demand what we would call complete 
ethnic assimilation from those who aspired to a German iden-
® Anonymous pamphlet. Die Deutschen tm Nationalitatenstaat Osterreich 
(Meran, 1887) 21.
’ Gustav Kolmer, Parlament imd Verfassung in Osterreich, 8 vols. 
(Vienna & Leipzig: C. Fromme, 1902-14) 1:89.
® See, for example, Peter Vodopivec' discussion of Slovene academic and 
writer Dragotin Dezman in “Die sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Ansichten des 
deutschen Burgertums in Krain vom Ende der sechziger bis zum Beginn der 
achtziger Jahre des 19. Jahrhunderts” in Geschichte der Deutschen im Bereich 
des heutigen Slowenien, 1848-1941, ed. H. Rumpler and A. Suppan (Vienna: 
Verlag fur Geschichte und Politik, 1988) particularly 87-93.
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tity. In theoiy, at least, German nationalists encouraged the 
local preservation of non-German languages and cultural tra­
ditions. After all, what language one spoke in the private 
sphere of the home or even at the local community level was 
hardly a matter of political concern. Nationalists did, however, 
expect strict assimilation to cosmopolitan German values in 
the context of one’s public or institutional life.^
Since the very existence of the central state guaranteed 
the German language a functionally privileged status, German 
liberals thought of themselves proudly as the monarchy’s 
Staatsvolk, or “state people,’’ and not at all equivalent to the 
other competing ethnic groups. They connected their own spe­
cial status to the very survival of the state. Not surprisingly, 
the sporadic attempts by a handful of German activists to de­
velop a politics organized specifically around German national­
ism before 1880 typically met with embarrassed silence or 
outright opposition from liberal leaders. German speakers 
needed no special nationalist movement: theirs was after all 
the language and culture of civilization. For the same reason 
German liberals interpreted early Slav nationalist demands for 
linguistic parity in the 1860s and 1870s more as a threat to 
the very state itself, and to the liberal ideas of civilization it 
embodied, than as a national threat to the Germans.
Neither this liberal vision of German identity nor the lib­
eral understanding of community was completely transparent 
in its enthusiasm for the eventual inclusion of ethnic others in 
the nation. Most liberals believed that full membership in the 
civic community had to be earned. They considered the vote, 
that ultimate token of inclusion, to be a political function as­
signed to people who had reached a certain level of eeonomic 
independence and educational achievement. In the 1870s, for 
example, German Liberal party leader Ernst von Plener chal­
lenged the Socialists’ characterization of the vote as a natural 
or civic right, calling it instead a function “that the state can
^ German Liberal party discussions of the proposed texts of a nationality 
clause for the 1867 constitution stressed the local rights of individual ethnic 
groups while retaining a privileged position for German in the administration. 
See especially Gerald Stourzh, “Die Gleichberechtlgung der Nationalitaten und 
die osterreichische Dezemberverfassung von 1867" in Der osterreichisch- 
ungarische Ausgleich von 1867. Vorgeschichte und Wirkungen. ed. P. Berger 
(Vienna: Herold, 1967) 186-218.
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confer ori those who offer a guarantee that they will exercise it 
properly. Laboring and petty-bourgeois males might gain 
the vote as they beeame more like the liberals themselves, that 
is, as they achieved sufficient property and education.
The same eould be said of liberal ideas about the monar­
chy’s various ethnic and religious groups. Neither geographic 
location nor sheer quantity (the number of people who spoke a 
given language) was as decisive in determining a group’s rela­
tive status or power as was quality, defined by eultural and 
finaneial achievement. Liberals based this understanding of 
the world on a set of erucial (if unacknowledged) epistemologi­
cal dualities that underlay their visions. They divided the uni­
verse into two theoretically separate and implicitly hierarchi­
cally arranged spheres, the worlds of active and passive citi­
zenship. The boundaries separating these two worlds were of­
ten masked by a universalist rhetoric that stressed active par­
ticipation and civic Inclusion. Liberals insisted on political 
equality for the inhabitants of the publie sphere. Nevertheless, 
the importance they assigned to financial independence and 
edueation enabled them to maintain hierarchically arranged 
relationships with the women and children, as well as racial 
and class inferiors, whose immaturity and dependent status 
kept them in the private sphere. One of liberalism’s most pow­
erful legaeies to the new nationalism in Austria was to be the 
translation of this fundamental relationship between the public 
and private spheres into a new set of publie hierarchies organ­
ized around national Identities.
An 1861 pamphlet entitled “The Germans in Krain” illus­
trates the startling ways in whieh ideas about national identity 
were still developing along the lines of liberal hierarchie con­
ceptions of active and passive citizenship rather than accord­
ing to purely linguistle or ethnic concepts of identity. “ The 
pamphlet replied to Slovene nationalist arguments that the 
identity of the province Krain (roughly eomparable to present- 
day Slovenia) was primarily Slavie, a claim based purely on the
See Stenographische Protokolle des Hauses der Abgeordneten (Vienna, 
1867-1911) session of 17 December 1874; also quoted in Wilhelm Wadi, Lib- 
eralismus und soziale Frage (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften, 1987) 233.
* ^ Anonymous, Das Deutschtum in Krain. Ein Wort zw Aujkldrung (Graz 
1862).
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evidence of how few people spoke German as opposed to Slo­
vene. The German-speaking author attributed the misguided 
belief that linguistic use alone determined national identity to 
the bad influence of Napoleonic ideas about universal suffrage. 
(“Popular rule established by a revolution is always Inimical to 
culture.”) The author then proceeded to explain why the na­
tional identity of Krain should be considered German. To begin 
with, “the history of the region suffices to prove that Krain was 
always a part of the German Confederation. Thus political 
tradition (which also placed Bohemia and Moravia in the Ger­
man confederation) pointed to a common identity with the rest 
of the German lands. But what political history tells us is of 
minor importance compared to what cultural history can reveal 
about national identity. “Whoever ... wanted to make any kind 
of career for himself, or to educate himself in any way, spoke 
and read German.... Over time,” continued the writer, “things 
developed so that on one side stood a raw, ignorant mass op­
posed to a small number of Germans on the other side who 
enjoyed the civilized pleasures of life.” Here the author admit­
ted that German speakers constituted a minority of the popu­
lation. Nevertheless, their mere presence gave the province a 
German national identity.
The author then reminded the reader that a German cul­
tural identity is certainly available to other peoples. After all, 
the Slav “who strove for education and who sought out Ger­
mans in order to gain culture from them was only following a 
natural urge; he sought his advantage.... Humanity strives for 
knowledge and culture, which the Slavs can only seek from the 
Germans, not the other way around.History was working 
inexorably, it seems, to create Germans of Slavs, once the lat­
ter had committed themselves to the general project of gaining 
enlightenment. In conclusion, this same author claimed that 
since “in every state intelligence, not numbers, has ruled,” the 
“Germans in Krain have the mission, as history demonstrates, 
to raise the Slovene people to a higher level of education, and it 
must fulfill this mission, without wanting simply to Germanize 
the people.” [emphasis addedji^ x^e writer made clear that his 
intention was not “simply to germanize” the populace, for that 
would involve forcing an emancipation that only education and
Deutschtum in Krain 9-11. 
Deutschtum in Krain 15.
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self-knowledge could bring about. And yet a chasm separated 
those who achieved culture and education from the “raw igno­
rant mass.” The occasional Slovene who wished “to make 
something of himself could only do so if he bridged the gap 
and joined the Germans. The differences in levels of civilization 
between German and Slovene cultures would always remain so 
large that Slovenes could obtain enlightenment only by becom­
ing Germans: there was no other possible alternate route to 
independence and active citizenship.
This pamphlet typified the views of German-speaking lib­
erals on matters of citizenship in the 1860s and 1870s. It sug­
gested both the idea of universal inclusion (anyone can become 
German and an active citizen) as well as the implicit notion of 
superiority and hierarchy (only Germans have a valid national 
Identity). Given this set of beliefs, German liberals saw little 
need to respond to the nationalist challenges posed by Czechs 
and Slovenes using arguments involving numbers. They mili­
tated against any attempt to pin down Germanness and the 
German community by specific location or population statis­
tics. Relief maps marking German territories were the furthest 
thing from their minds; after all, their understanding of na­
tional identity implied that any territory in Central Europe 
could become German and that Germanness could not be lim­
ited simply to places where German speakers constituted a 
numerical majority. German power in the monarchy, they be­
lieved, derived not from numbers but from an advanced civili­
zation that guaranteed German its privileged position as the 
language of the bureaucracy and the language of instruction at 
all Austrian universities, from Graz to Prague, from Lemberg 
(Lvov) to Czernowltz (Cemauti).
Historians traditionally believed that this attitude changed 
abruptly in 1866 when Prussia defeated Austria militarily and 
ejected it from the German Confederation. In particular they 
claimed that this event launched a significant German na­
tionalist movement that sought to join the primarily German­
speaking regions of Austria to the new German Empire. Yet 
with the exception of a politically insignificant minority, most 
German-speaking Austrians did not adopt this view.i^ Modem
1865 the emperor had suspended the constitution of 1861, and 
most Austrian German politicians interpreted the defeat of 1866 in moral 
terms as a result of this egregious form of government misrule. They used the
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nationalist movements do not grow out of simple facts such as 
language use or objective appraisals of census results. And in 
Austria in the 1860s, the political power and cultural hegem­
ony of the German middle classes was still very much on the 
rise. Only a year later in 1867 the German liberals in Austria 
celebrated their greatest political triumph as the emperor re­
luctantly conceded to their demands for a real constitution. 
The simultaneous division of the empire into self-administering 
Austrian and Hungarian halves in 1867 only reinforced the 
notion of a predominantly German cultural identity for the 
western half.
These political circumstances changed only In the 1880s 
when the German liberals unexpectedly lost their majority in 
the Austrian Parliament. Still, it was not the fall of the German 
Liberal cabinet that changed people’s views on national iden­
tity so much as the aggressively anti-Liberal and explicitly 
anti-German tone adopted by the new government. This coali­
tion of conservative, clerical, and Slavic nationalist parties un­
der Count Eduard Taaffe, known as the Iron Ring, created an 
Austrian state that no longer explicitly endorsed the privileges 
of German culture and language.^® The new government 
moved quickly to pass a series of laws designed to equalize 
Czech and German language use in provincial courts in Bo­
hemia and Moravia, and it divided the Charles University in 
Prague into German and Czech-language sections. By them­
selves these measures did not necessarily constitute an attack 
on the interests of German nationalists. The second measure 
had in fact attracted some German liberal support in the 
1870s when it was first debated. The new government, how­
ever, framed this legislation explicitly as a well-deserved con­
cession to the Czech nationalist parties and thereby caused 
panic among German liberals in Bohemia and Moravia. The 
same thing occurred when the government decided to reduce 
suffrage requirements from ten to five gulden in annual taxes. 
Although some German liberals had proposed similar meas­
ures in the 1870s, they now saw the measure as a blatant at-
defeat as an opportunity to argue for a restoration of the constitution and an 
expansion of the civic rights that it had guaranteed.
On the advent of the Iron Ring and its policies see W. Jenks, Austria 
under the Iron Ring 1879-1893 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia 
Press, 1965).
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tempt to alter the balance of power in favor of the Slavic par­
ties in Parliament. In ethnically mixed provinces, German 
speakers tended to belong to the wealthier urban commercial 
and industrial classes, while Czechs and Slovenes were pri­
marily peasants or involved in rural industries. The govern­
ment’s lowering of the franchise tax requirements tended to 
increase the proportion of Slavic to German voters.
It was only at this point that German national identity be­
came detached from its traditional association with the central 
state. With this detachment came a politicization of German 
nationality as a means of combating the hostile new order that 
had taken over the reins of government. Self-identified German 
liberal nationalists developed defensive strategies against the 
new government’s policies, strategies modeled on successful 
Czech nationalist politics as well as on liberal organizational 
traditions. A network of regional and interregional voluntary 
associations based on the example of liberal political clubs, 
and organized around nationalist Issues, spearheaded the new 
movement.
These associations published universalist appeals, inviting 
all Germans to join in a common venture that outweighed any 
possible social or political distinctions, In doing so, they be­
gan subtly to transform the earlier liberal appeal to a culture of 
elite humanism into an ethnically limited vision of nation 
based on linguistic and cultural ties. Within that nation, rela­
tions would be egalitarian, since members of any class or de­
gree of education would share a common right to Germanness. 
“The German national movement,” wrote one activist in 1881,
These organizations, like their liberal predecessors, tended to reward 
their wealthier or better educated members with higher status positions of 
leadership. In this sense they inherited the liberal principles that combined a 
rhetoric of universal paitlcipaUon with an implicit system of social deference 
that privileged the wealthier or better educated members of a community. 
Lower middle-class German nationalists, frustrated by their inability to gain 
much Influence in this new nationalist movement, often turned to anti-Semitic 
German nationalism as a more democratic alternative. See Pieter M. Judson, 
“‘Whether Race or Conviction Should Be the Standard’: National IdenUty and 
Liberal Politics in 19th-century Austria,” Austrian History Yearbook 22 (1991): 
76-95.
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knows no division of the community interest into individual 
interests ... the movement detests political organizations that 
try to invent and sharpen differences between city and coun­
tryside. We Austro-Germans desire the welfare of our united 
people; every member of the race, whether in priest’s or bu­
reaucrat’s dress, whether in Burger or farmer’s clothing, is 
welcome in our national union.
The appeal not only worked to erase potential class differences 
within an imagined German community: it also began, however 
subtly, to delineate the spatial dimensions of that national 
community, cleeirly locating it in both the city and the coun­
tryside. Since, in fact, those in the countryside had expressed 
very little interest in nationalist issues up until this moment, it 
was important to locate national identity as much in the rural 
areas as in urban ones.
The new nationalist associations emerged primarily, but 
not exclusively, in ethnically mixed regions, often to combat 
incursions by rival Czech nationalist organizations, which had 
themselves been busy defining local politics in terms of na­
tionalist identity for over a decade. As language use replaced 
humanist ideals or financial accomplishment as the primary 
standard for measuring an individual’s identity, and as knowl­
edge of German no longer guaranteed local supremacy, activ­
ists increasingly worried about numbers. They aimed to regain 
political power by mobilizing superior numbers, to mobilize 
new social groups into the public political sphere where they 
could reinforce German nationalist claims to social privilege. 
Still, liberal nationalists faced several dilemmas as they strug­
gled to create a politics organized around national identity. 
They sought to recruit new social forces to help strengthen 
their movement without unleashing the violence of a social 
revolution. The task was epic in proportions, for it required co­
ordination among several ambitious projects. If all German 
speakers had to be convinced of the primacy of their German 
national Identity—itself no small task—they also had to be 
mobilized in a useful, controlled way, one that did not endan­
ger bourgeois leadership within this expanded German com­
munity.
Hans Stlngl, Die Nationalveretne der deutschen Burger und Bauem 
(Krems, 1881) 2-3.
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I have dealt elsewhere with the specific ways in which lib­
erals worked to control this mobilization by defining the exter­
nal marks of Germanness in terms of bourgeois modes of be­
havior, Here 1 am more concerned with examining the other 
half of the equation, namely with the question of national 
rhetoric: just how did activists generate enthusiasm for na­
tional identity at the local level? How did they manage the 
ideological transformation of the German community from an 
abstract but exclusive collective hovering over Central Europe 
to one more tangibly rooted in local situations and landscapes? 
How did nationalist activists embed new ideas about national 
identity in a context of local identities? How, for example, did 
activists create a belief that profound differences separated 
neighbors who had hitherto shared several elements of local 
identity in a multilingual society?
The activists who promulgated the new nationalist identi­
ties drew from a fairly limited repertoire derived from their po­
litical experiences in the old liberal-dominated polity of the 
1860s and 1870s. At first, their liberalism shaped the national­
ist identities they constructed. Like liberalism, which had theo­
retically transcended the boundaries of ethnicity, region, or 
religion, the new nation constituted a community whose mem­
bers, of whatever class background, shared a fundamental 
identity, one that far outweighed their real-world social differ­
ences. Yet also like liberalism, the new nationalism was organ­
ized around a series of essential differences, hierarchically ar­
ranged, separating members of the German community from 
members of other nations. If language use was to serve as the 
primary measure of this national identity—rather than educa­
tion or accomplishment—it would still be within a liberal con­
ceptual framework. The strategies for locating this new na­
tional identity in local contexts were organized around a recon­
ceptualization of the local landscape according to terms derived 
from history and geography.
The first and most critical of these strategies involved the 
idea of the frontier, the border, the geographic place where op­
posing nations met and confronted each other, the setting for
See Judson, “‘Whether Race or Conviction Should Be the Standard’” 
and “Inventing Germans: Class, Nationality and Colonial Fantasy at the Mar­
gins of the Hapsburg Monarchy,” Social Analysis 33, special issue Nations, 
Colonies and Metropoles, ed. Daniel Segal and Richard Handler (1993): 47-67.
Frontiers, Islands, Forests, Stones 395
the colossal and daily struggle between nations. Language 
use was the critical marker of identity that situated the indi­
vidual in this newly nationalized geographic setting. Regions in 
Bohemia, Moravia, or Styria became known as frontiers, al­
though not because of their relative geographic or economic 
marginality to the rest of the monarchy. 20 Rather, the term 
indicated that German speakers in these territories lived 
among peoples who spoke other languages.21
While people on this frontier fought daily battles to main­
tain their German identity, others in the centers of German 
culture mobilized to support them, like home-front volunteers 
during a war. The Vienna-based German School Association 
[Deutscher Schulverein], for example, worked to awaken Ger­
mans all over the monarchy to the plight of their brethren on 
the frontier. This organization, founded in 1880, raised money 
to fund schools in ethnically mixed regions where not enough 
German-speaking children lived to warrant state support for 
German-language schools.22 Using an alarmist rhetoric which
This struggle was conceptualized by some in terms borrowed from the 
colonial experiences of Britain, France, and Germany. Certainly, the reconcep­
tualization of Germans as a people bringing civilization to the rugged, uncivi­
lized East suggests this comparison, as did the Lockean notion that the Slavs, 
like other colonized peoples, forfeited ownership of the land because they 
could not cultivate it as productively as the Germans. The comparison, al­
though powerful, is mainly a rhetorical one, since economic relations in the 
disputed territories do not resemble the colonizing experiences of Europeans 
in Africa, Asia, or the Americas.
2° In the 1880s Bohemia and Moravia were in fact the most important 
centers of industrial production in the monarchy.
2* The historian must be careful to avoid lending any credence to the 
notion that inhabitants of ethnically mixed regions somehow had a prior 
authentic national identity due to their language use, even if they remained 
technically unwilling to see themselves in such terms. In many regions of the 
monarchy individuals used several languages depending on the social context, 
whether domestic, public, or commercial. According to earlier definitions, a 
good knowledge of German might qualify an individual for a German identity, 
even though he might use a different language at home. By the 1880s, how­
ever, such an assumption no longer held true.
22 For the state to support a primary school in a given language, there 
had to be at least forty school-age children in a single locality who spoke that 
language.
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suggested that the German language was dying out “on the 
frontier” for laek of German-language schools, the association 
rapidly gained the highest membership—over 100,000—of any 
bourgeois organization in Central Europe. As they adopted a 
rhetoric of numbers and national competition, activists also 
broadened their concerns from schooling to creating economic 
opportunities for German speakers of the working classes who 
might otherwise emigrate. By claiming to address a variety of 
specifically local social problems, albeit in nationalist terms, 
these organizations quickly gained a significant following for 
themselves in the ethnically mixed regions.
The Union of the Bohemian Woods, for example, spon­
sored educational and apprenticeship programs for workers 
and employment bureaus and craft fairs to improve economic 
opportunities for artisans. It admonished its female members 
to hire only German-speaking domestics, and it also worked to 
lower the rate of illegitimate births and alcoholism among 
German-speaking working women. In an effort to lure tourists 
away from nearby Bavaria, the union even published guide­
books that touted the splendors of hiking the hills of southern 
Bohemia.
The Sudmark, founded in 1889 to protect German inter­
ests from Slovene attack in South Styria, went so far as to 
promote immigration by poor farming families from South 
Germany. This organization hoped to buy up land that it could 
then make available to settlers at reduced rates and “gradually 
create bridges among the urban islands” of German speakers 
that dotted an imagined ocean of Slovenes.^^ organization 
openly admitted its goal, “not simply to protect existing 
[German] property” but to “win new land.” Another association, 
the Union of Germans in North Moravia, also promised to “win 
back ...territory that once belonged to us.”^^
Like the idea of the frontier, the new term Sprachinsel 
(literally, “language island”) was another strategic innovation, 
coined to refer to towns inhabited by a majority of German 
speakers surrounded by a Slavic rural population. The chang­
ing self-identification of the German-speaking elite in the small
See Friedrich Pock, Grenzwacht im Sudosten: etn halbes Jahrhundert 
Sudmark (Graz, 1940) 8.
“Der Bund der Deutschen Nordmahrens" in Deutsche Volkskalender 
Jur das Jahr 1888 (Olmutz: Alpenland-Buchhandlung Sudmark, 1888) 5.
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Moravian city of Iglau mentioned at the outset again provides 
an instructive example. In the 1850s, a travel account written 
by a prominent Moravian casually mentioned that while “the 
language of the inhabitants [of Iglau] is predominantly German 
... the domestic servants speak mostly Bohemian or Moravian.” 
Like other German-speaking liberals of his time, the author 
unselfconsciously linked language use to class position and 
not to membership in sepeirately defined cultural or national 
communities. He did not even refer to the language spoken by 
the servants as a single rival language, Czech, which would 
imply national competition, but simply as local dialects 
{Bohemian and Moravian). Thirty-five years later, however, 
when the city’s political leaders created the German Associa­
tion for Iglau, they dramatized their national isolation by invok­
ing the spatial metaphor of the island. Their program vowed “to 
nurture and protect the Germanic basis of our language is­
land, to keep it undiminished and unbowed.”^® Creating an 
image of an island under siege, they redefined local identity 
along national lines. They downplayed the attention to class 
position that had struck the earlier observer as the more sig­
nificant form of difference while mapping their linguistic iden­
tity using a geographic metaphor.
As part of yet another strategy to make the national status 
of these frontiers and islands visible to their inhabitants, Ger­
man activists pointed to an array of local physical markers as 
the repositories of German identity. These markers might be 
cultural repositories of Germanness, as in the case of architec­
tural and farming styles, or what I refer to as stones. Yet the 
very physical landscape itself might also be claimed as a spe­
cifically German place, as with forests like the Bohemian 
Woods. In both cases these familiar markers helped to map 
national differences in the confusing world of cultural mixing. 
Not only did these signs embody the German spirit of a certain 
locality: they also served to negotiate between local community 
identities and the larger, transregional nation. These markers 
helped to distinguish what was authentically German from 
what was Slavic at the local level and to connect those local 
German elements to a larger. Central European German cul­
ture.
25 See Deutscher Volkskalender fur die Iglauer Sprachinsel (1887) 7-8.
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Nationalist associations encouraged people to meditate on 
the specifically German elements in their personal identities by 
attributing civilized virtues like “rationality,” “neatness,” or 
“careful planning” to German farms and towns in ethnically 
mixed regions. These virtues had the advantage of making 
Germanness so vague in content that it was easily visible to 
the casual observer (or as one nationalist noted, “every human 
activity that raises itself above the lowest levels is German, and 
only in the lowest categories does German work share its tasks 
with Slavic work”). That said, “sloppiness” clearly became the 
most recognizable attribute of the Slavs.^^
It was not only important to establish the visible superior­
ity of Germanness: the German history of these places also 
had to be made visible. Activists often referred to a civilizing 
mission undertaken by German-speaking colonists of the 
Middle Ages who had established outposts in barbarous Slavic 
territories. Even the recent Slav migrations back into those 
territories could not erase signs of German civilization planted 
centuries before. Discussing urban landscapes on the frontier, 
the Moravian Armand von Dumreicher guided his readers’ at­
tention to the few physical remains of this bygone civilizing in­
fluence. “Even older neighborhoods in present-day Slavic mu­
nicipalities show a German orientation. All of this eastern 
culture was planted by German burgher colonists. ”2’’ ‘Today, a 
bustling Slavic folk life fills the mighty and worthy frames left 
over from a German past. If the German people have vanished, 
their creations can still be found. The stones still speak there .. 
they speak of that which was and is no more.”^® The stones, 
through their rational and distinctive placement, offer physical 
proof of the German identity of the place.
Taking this strategy to a new level, well beyond those who 
located the German Identity of the region in the ostensibly 
civilizing ventures of medieval German colonizers, another 
writer claimed the entire Bohemian Woods region as the origi­
nal (ur) home of ancient forest-dwelling Bavarians. He attrib-
See discussion of this and further examples cited in Judson, 
“Inventing Germans” and Maria Lammlch, Das deutsche Osteuropabild in der 
Zeit der Reichsgrimdung (Boppard am Rhein; H. Boltd, 1976) 37-40.
Armand von Dumreicher, Sudostdeutsche Betrachtungen (Leipzig: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1893) 33.
Dumreicher 38.
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uted the ethnically mixed character of much of the region to 
recent Czech nationalist attempts to infiltrate the region and 
discredit its history as a purely German place.^^ Like much of 
this genre, his argument cites historical example in its attempt 
to establish an authentic German identity for the natural land­
scape. Yet by giving the Bohemian Woods a German identity, 
the writer produced an ahistoric vision of that local landscape. 
The place is German because it was originally German, despite 
whatever developments the vagaries of history have brought. 
This epistemological confusion shows how these arguments 
merged the older concept of German national rights based on 
cultural achievement with a more essentialist concept of na­
tional rights based on timeless truths. Paradoxically, the 
popular liberal mania for an empiricist, positivist science 
seems to have worked equally well to support both kinds of 
arguments.
Creolization of language and particularly of place names in 
ethnically mixed areas presented scientific-minded nationalists 
with a fertile field for connecting national identity to physical 
landscape.^° In an exhaustive article entitled “Plockenstein or 
Bldckenstein—Chapter from Our Motherlanguage” one activ­
ist warned against the various Czechified place names that had 
come into common usage in Southern Bohemia.^^ “Pldcken- 
stein or Bldckenstein” referred to the local names for a promi­
nent stone peak that dominated the southern region of the Bo­
hemian Woods. One of the two, it turned out, was in fact a 
creolized version of the original, purely German name. This 
“speaking stone” communicated its own authentic national 
identity and confirms the national Identity of the natural land- 
seape to those whose scientific tools are capable of locating its 
original name.
The same article cited other examples of creolized place 
names in the Bohemian Woods region, suggesting that the na-
Reiner von Reinohl, “Der tschechische Schulverein,” Deutsche Worte 
(Vienna, 1885).
Here I am not referring to those groups that tried to purify the Ger­
man language of foreign expressions and constructions (usually French and 
Latin), found in imperial Germany as well as in Austria, but rather to those 
groups that sought to replace local place names and usages with the authen­
tic German originals.
31 See MDB, no. 2 (1885): 26-28.
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tives had lost touch with their German history and identity. It 
was bad enough, for example, that the castle town Krummau 
(from krumme Au “twisted Au”) was regularly spelled with a 
single m aeeording to the Czech fashion (a flurry of protests 
and petitions orehestrated by the same author actually re­
stored Krummau’s authentic German spelling to some maps of 
the region): even worse, whole Czech words often blended with 
German words to create completely new names. According to 
this author, the town Unter-Wuldau offered a particularly dis­
astrous example of this kind of creolization. Situated on the 
Moldau River downstream from the town of Ober-Moldau, Un­
ter-Wuldau derived its name from a mixing of the German 
Moldau with the Czech Vltava, both names for the same river 
{Vltava + Moldau = Wulddj.
Such articles alerted Germans to reflect on the names they 
gave their local surroundings. Their deeper aim, however, was 
to redefine the natural landscape itself as national property. 
HaAdng read sueh a detailed article on linguistic origins, village 
inhabitants eould never again look upon the landscape, domi­
nated by either the mountain peak or the river, without reflect­
ing on their German identity.
The high point of activity for nationalists on the frontier 
came with the decennial censuses of 1880, 1890, and 1900. 
The publleation of the first of these seemed to justify the new 
nationalist arguments, which no longer measured a nation’s 
importance by its degree of civilization but by the numbers of 
people it could muster. German liberals read the 1880 cen­
sus as a eonfirmation of their community’s decline. This was 
largely due to recent politieal events and not to any particular 
statistical result. Had they retained control of the political 
system, for example, or successfully blocked some of the Iron 
Ring’s linguistic reforms, German nationalists might well have 
continued to justify their predominance solely in terms of eul-
There are remarkably few good analyses of social and political issues 
surrounding the decennial censuses in the Habsburg Monarchy. One of these, 
which relies on examples from Italian- and Slovene-speaking regions, is Emil 
Brix, “Die Erhebung der Umgangssprache im zisleithanischen Osterreich 
(1880-1910). Nationale und sozio-okonomlschen Ursachen der Sprachenk- 
onflikte,” Mittheilungen des Jnstituts JCir osterreichische Geschichte, no. 87 
(Vienna, 1979); 363-439. See also Cohen’s excellent analysis of the censuses 
in Prague.
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tural achievement. Under the new political circumstances, 
however, their permament minority status in provinces like Bo­
hemia and Moravia itself became a cause for concern. The cen­
sus enabled German nationalists to express their losses 
through the use of statistics, to map them, to shade their re­
gions, and to locate linguistic boundaries with some accuracy. 
German nationalists might not accept the results of the 1880 
census, might accuse the Czechs of all manner of chicanery, 
but they nevertheless used the census as a standard against 
which to measure future gains and losses.
In 1890 the Union of Bohemian Woods provided its mem­
bers with several detailed strategies for dealing with the next 
census. The association changed its goal from raising the gen­
eral proportion of German speakers in Bohemia to establishing 
that, although a frontier area, the Bohemian Woods was itself 
purely German. This change followed a general reorientation of 
German political strategy in the 1880s. Recognizing that the 
Iron Ring’s suffrage reforms had made it impossible ever to re­
gain a political majority in the Bohemia Diet, German national­
ists instead demanded that the government enact a complete 
administrative separation between Czech and German regions 
of Bohemia. If the census results categorized the Bohemian 
Woods as a mixed region rather than as a purely German one, 
administrative separation would be far more difficult to 
achieve. The Czechs might even gain part of the region, some 
German speakers might eventually find themselves trapped in 
a Czech district, or the government would conclude that sepa­
ration on the basis of language was impossible to achieve. Na­
tionalist activists accused their Czech counterparts of stopping 
at nothing to achieve the latter result from the census:
The Czechs will not even concede to us national rights and 
peace in our own regions [emphasis added]: they claim, in 
fact, that no closed, German-speaking region in Bohemia ex­
ists at all. They want to prove that Czechs live in every part of 
Bohemia, while Germans do not, that there is no place where 
Czechs do not live alongside Germcms.... One of our rival as­
sociations makes no secret of its policy to send agents into 
purely German regions ... in order to create a small Czech 
enclave there.... If a handful of Czech speakers ...is employed 
as servants in a German town, then it isn’t long before some 
leading [Czech] personality arrives demanding Czech schools
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... which create new burdens for the German municipalities 
and sow disunity among their inhabitants.^^
The writer of this article echoed the class-based resent­
ments of an educated German minority, angry that the pres­
ence of a handful of uneducated Czech servants might be 
enough to discredit the authentically German identity of a re­
gion. The bitter realization that arriving Czech workers no 
longer willing to convert to a German identity or to learn the 
German language might threaten their region’s traditional 
identity also led activists to blame Czech nationalists for 
“creating” false Czech populations where they would not oth­
erwise have existed. As one writer noted, “Until now numerous 
Czech immigrants, almost all members of the lowest classes, 
willingly renounced their nationality and attached themselves 
to the Germans.” The growing presence of Czech voluntary as­
sociations in German communities encouraged those workers 
who might have learned German to adhere instead to a Czech 
national identity.
So far 1 have concentrated on tracing the rhetorical strate­
gies employed by German nationalists. But how did these rhe­
torical transformations shape Austrian political culture? How 
politically effective was this nationalization of local identities? 
The old German liberal political culture of the 1860s and 
1870s had functioned primarily in parliamentary coalitions 
created by regional bourgeois elites, all interested in maintain­
ing the power of the central state. By contrast, the new politics 
rested on its ability to frame popular local identities in univer­
sal German terms. These identities in turn demanded unified 
action from the nation against the anti-German efforts of the 
central state.
Using aids like the relief map of Southern Bohemia cited 
at the outset to produce knowledge about local landscapes and 
peoples across the monarchy created important political con­
sequences. German-speaking people in mixed regions often
See the article “Zur Volkszahlung” in MDB, no. 23 (December 1890): 
241-42. The article provided several “horror stories” from the 1880 census 
Involving German speakers who had been mistakenly categorized as Czechs 
due to the ruthless efforts of pro-Czech bureaucrats.
Michael Hainisch, Die Zukunft der Deutsch-Osterreicher. Eine statis- 
tische-volkswirtschafdiche Studie (Vienna: F. Deuticke, 1892) 9.
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came to see themselves primarily in nationalist terms, and 
German speakers in the “homogenous” regions did come to 
identify their Interests with those of their brethren on the fron­
tier. Together, they created a popular, interregional German 
politics whose success constituted nothing short of a revolu­
tion in political behavior. The stoiy of the Cilli (Cilje) crisis of 
1894-95 illustrates the ways in which this interregional Ger­
man nationalist identity exerted political influence. In 1893 the 
German Liberal party had finally returned to power in coalition 
with two other parties. One of the legacies of the pro-Slav Iron 
Ring government (1879-93) had been an agreement to fund a 
Slovene-language secondary school in the Styrian town of Cilli. 
The new Liberal government had no say in the matter; it sim­
ply had to budget the funds to administer this decision. When 
the new cabinet took up this minor administrative matter, 
however, it was shocked by the Intensity of public reaction.
As expected, local German nationalists in Styria com­
plained that placing a Slovene school in a Sprachinsel, an em­
battled German town surrounded by a Slovene hinterland, 
constituted an act of national expropriation. What astonished 
most politicians, however, was the intensity of the response 
among German speakers in other parts of the monarchy. For 
the first time, Bohemian and Moravian public opinion looked 
beyond its regional political interests to identify with the plight 
of a German community in far-away southern Styria. Clearly, 
these German speakers had adopted a transregional and spa­
tially oriented concept of national identity, one that staked a 
claim to those territories, wherever in the monarchy, that were 
and must remain German. The extraordinary public outcry 
convinced the reluctant German Liberal party leaders to with­
draw support from their own cabinet or risk losing the next 
elections to the more radically nationalist anti-Semites.
The relatively mild Cilli crisis was followed by serious out­
breaks of public violence at the publication of the Badeni Lan­
guage Ordinances for Bohemia and Moravia in 1897. The will­
ingness of German speakers of all classes in Reichenberg, 
Graz, Briinn, or Vienna to take to the streets to fight legislation 
for Bohemia and Moravia that they all claimed deprived them 
of their “national property” ended any hopes for resolving na­
tionalist conflict through negotiation. After this incident bu­
reaucratic rule by decree gradually replaced the liberal parlia­
mentary process.
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Both these examples point to the power and limits of the 
nationalist revolution as well as to the far-reaching conse­
quences of grounding national identity in spatial terms. While 
the new nationalist movement effectively coordinated an inter­
regional nationalist system of defense, it was ultimately inca­
pable of fostering a positive and unified national program, one 
organized around a single compelling understanding of Ger­
man identity. If their new nationalist efforts had helped to 
bring the Liberals back into power in 1893, it had also caused 
their downfall. In 1895 the German liberals found themselves 
once more in the ranks of the parliamentary opposition, this 
time thanks to the very success of their populist nationalism 
rather than because of their lack of committed supporters. 
They now experienced with bitterness the fruit of their efforts 
to construct a mass politics, victims, in a sense, of their own 
success. They had devoted significant resources and plenty of 
rhetoric in the 1880s to mobilizing the public around national­
ist issues in order to regain control of the state. Yet once they 
had accomplished this aim, the nationalist fervor they had 
unleashed turned against the state itself. In fact, many activ­
ists now regretted the breakdown of public order that accom­
panied interregional nationalist agitation, and some of them 
began to question the more radically essentialist arguments 
about national identity that their followers had deployed. In a 
revealing article analyzing the results of the 1900 census, the 
Union of the Bohemian Woods seems to have repudiated num­
bers and ethnic purity for an older and recognizably liberal 
rhetoric of cultural supremacy, to justify German hegemony in 
local relations in that ethnically mixed region:
The absolute numbers of the census results are not the cor­
rect standard for measuring the relative significance [status] 
of a national group in a particular district or region. Of far 
greater meaning is the tax contribution, the degree of educa­
tion, and other cultural markers. In ethnically mixed regions
For a generai account of the Ciiii crisis from the point of view of party 
poiitics, see Lothar Hobelt, Komblume und Kaiseradler (Vienna: Veriag fur 
Geschichte und Politik, 1993) 106-16.
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the political influence of one or another nation cannot simply 
be measured by the statistical size of each nation
Here we see a belated attempt to bring order and hierarchy 
back into the German community from above by returning to 
the older liberal values of education and property and down­
playing the newer nationalist arguments that relied on num­
bers and territories. If “cultural markers” justified assigning 
the Germans a greater influence than their numerical minority 
status would allow, then the same values act as implicit stan­
dards to determine hierarchies within the German community 
itself. At the same time, giving greater weight to those cultural 
markers diminished the importance of linguistic or ethnic 
identity.
The creation of a mass politics organized around German 
identities and rooted in local geography replaced several tradi­
tional forms of community hierarchy with one standard of ab­
solute value: Germanness. Much social and political conflict at 
the turn of the century came to be expressed using the rhetoric 
of Germanness. If one defined it in terms of civilization, educa­
tion, or property ownership, then traditional elite groups might 
use Germanness to maintain their influence within this ever- 
expanding political community. If, however, one defined Ger­
manness in other ways, as for example in terms of racial 
authenticity, then Germanness might become a tool for social 
revolution, for replacing the leadership of traditional bourgeois 
elites with that of emerging populist activists. In both cases, 
the location of Germanness in regional geography and identi­
ties had replaced the vague abstract culture of values it had 
encompassed in the liberal era (1848-79). If this culture had 
formerly hovered tantalizingly over several kinds of geographic 
and cultural spaces in Central Europe, it was now firmly an­
chored in specific places Identifiable on a map.
Superficially at least, the creation of the Austrian Republic 
solved the question of ethnically mixed regions for many Ger­
man speakers after 1918, as did the expulsion of the Sudeten 
and Moravian Germans from Czechoslovakia after 1945. Aus­
tria became an ethnically German state, while Bohemia and 
Moravia became ethnically Czech. Yet the fact that most Aus- 
tro-Germans no longer lived in close contact with neighbors
36 MDB, no. 44 (1901): 5.
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who spoke different languages seems to have made little differ­
ence in how they understood their community identities. For 
many of them, their national identity continued to be shaped 
by the nineteenth-centuiy nationalist rhetoric about society 
that had emerged from liberal traditions in the 1880s. This 
rhetoric combined public community equality for Germans, 
however defined, with veiled concepts of hierarchy meant to 
distinguish Germans from those ethnic and racial others who 
remained outside the imagined community of German citizens. 
But this rhetoric also continued the ideological innovations of 
the 1880s, which had located national identity spatially in 
particularly German spaces. This helps to explain an apparent 
paradox that recent travelers in the Czech Republic, including 
this writer, have noted: the vociferous descendants of the 
Sudeten Germans argue at every opportunity on their visits 
there that the Bohemian Woods, although now inhabited only 
by Czech speakers, is in fact German.^^
In the summer of 1989 I made the first of several research trips to the 
Bohemian Woods. Before crossing into still-Communist Czechoslovakia I 
ciimbed a tower that had been erected in Austria at the top of a hill to afford 
tourists a view across the border. The place had been dubbed the Moldaublick, 
and indeed, each of us binoculared tourists had a splendid view of the south­
ern Bohemian Woods. At the Moldaublick 1 read an informative historical de­
scription of the view in a pamphlet printed by the nearby Gemeinde Ul- 
rlchsberg, as well as a poem entitled “Verlorene Heimat” (Lost Homeland), 
which was provided free of charge to all visitors. What struck me about this 
poem was not so much the expected lament for a lost homeland but rather the 
specificity with which the poem located this idealized Heimat village of Gldck- 
elberg in the landscape Itself. One could stand atop the tower armed only with 
the poem and locate Glockelberg’s geographic situation, its placement in a 
certain valley, and its relation to other natural and manmade landmarks. Yet 
it was not so much the geographic content of the poetry that intrigued me but 
rather the confident identification of the natural landscape Itself with a Ger­
man national identity. That former Bohemian Germans and their descendants 
might harbor a sense of ownership about lost communities, houses, or views 
is hardly remarkable. But what did require some explanation was the confi­
dent endowment of the very physical landscape itself with a transhistorical 
German identity.
